09/07/2007
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For Wuod Luo
From: Wibur Wesley
Wuod Luo
I wish to add my “pesa nane”
to your questions below which are so large as to not elicit
exhaustive answers. Politics in
Kenya are also quite
fluid and no particular observations can be regarded as accurate.
Read these observations and subject them to further
discussion.Politics is, after all, not an exact
science.
I have inserted my contribution to your
questions below:
To the
forum’s political analysts, what are your views on
these?:
- What are ODM chances in the Kalenjin Rift Valley, in the face of Moi’s endorsement of Kibaki?
With declaration of the ODM candidate, it will
be interesting to see which of the myriad
“obstacles-as-political-resources” would be deployed
by Moi to convince the Rift Valley tribes (mainly Kalenjin) to
deny Raila Odinga their block regional vote. The factors in the
anti-Raila arsenal include the opportunistic ghost of ethnicity,
the clash between reform politics and colonial style
conservatism, between the historical political relationship
between the Odingas and the Moi presidency (detentions without
trial, Raila’s role in the historic short-changing of the
Moi political succession game plan), the reform credentials Raila
presents vis-à-vis the corruption Pandora’s box
plaguing the Moi family and, the vulnerability of the Kibaki
presidency. One might add the fertile opportunity to placate a
disenchanted Kalenjin community smarting from the guilt of tribal
clashes and apprehensive of a Kikuyu vengeance is likely to be
exploited by the Kibaki team. By reassuring the Kamatusa
(Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu) not only to expect no
revenge but also offering them a prominent place in a second term
Kibaki presidency, the incumbent might just succeed in swaying
their vote. This, however, presents an unlikely scenario
considering that Kamatusa forces are arrayed on two critical
sides: the conservative
“Raila-will-prosecute-our-past-crimes-including-political-assassinations-and-grand
kleptocracy” group and the progressive
“Kalenjins-must-break-with-the-past-and-chart-a-new-course-through-new-strategic-partnerships-with-strong-political-formations”
group. The former are the Moi regime power brokers and hence the
lot that plundered the Kenyan economy and left it for a dead cow
while the latter are the aspiring parliamentary candidates who
either are making their political debuts or broke ranks with the
Moi kleptocratic orligarchy.
The factors listed above are real and might be
deployed in Moi’s “vengeance-is-mine” scheme to
deny Raila a stub at the presidency. How? Ethnic divide-and-rule
was created by colonialists and perfected in
Kenya by Moi. He (Moi)
was successful in creating nearly credible scenarios of tribal
advantage that were never real. He has so far been successful in
engaging the national psyche, actually fear-mongering
about forces of tribalism (even in the same breath
as he offers to guide Kalenjin political choices!!).
Historically, it has been quite easy to invoke tribalism to
demonize a Luo backed course in
Kenya (this is too
large a topic to be discussed here). Next is the manipulation of
issues to convince Kibaki that the Kikuyus are as much a target
of Raila’s presidential wrath as the Kalenjins might be
hence the need to fight the common cause of blocking a Raila
presidency. This ploy would help kill many birds with the same
stone: assure Moi’s presidential clan’s immunity from
imagined prosecution by Raila, assure Kibaki a second term, put
back Moi’s presidential succession plans on track, develop
a dynasty of sorts among presidential families and maim Raila
Odinga politically forever.
The Kalenjin vote will be determined by the
extent to which Moi remains a portent political factor in
Kenya and, in
particular, in the Rift Valley. Kalenjins lost their primary
economic mainstay occupations to Moi’s
mismanagement: the dairy, wheat and corn industry,
livestock production, textile industries etc. Their collective
ethnic image was sacrificed in the ill-advised ethnic cleansing
that targeted Kikuyu land proprietorship in the Rift Valley.
Their earnings plummeted, livelihoods disrupted and socially
vulnerable family units dislocated economically. These factors
can be treacherous to anyone trying to re-deploy them to
determine political preference for whole
communities.
- Is it true that a section of current RV MPs are unpopular with their electorate and are therefore anti ODM simply because their competitors (aspirants) have already identified with the party?
This is true of any political elections:
incumbents vs favored (first past the finishing line) party
functionaries. It is as true in Otieno Kajwang’s Mbita
constituency as it is in Lugari. In a country in which party
membership and party politics are still infantile as in
Kenya’s case (and don’t get me wrong here: our
concept of parties was summarized by an MP who likened parties to
underwears which one changes whenever they get soiled) people
will join whatever parties promise greater chances to win seats,
not on the basis of political convictions or values. True, the
Kalenjin MPs find themselves between a rock and a hard place:
loyalties for survival in the current political dispensation and
considerations for surviving the electoral contest. They are,
therefore, yours for the asking based on the strength of your
party’s promise and would logically find natural enemies in
those who are already; “first-past-the-post” as far
as party membership is concerned. We are at this point
approaching a harvest season of defections and nothing is, yet,
cast in stone.
- What are ODM’s chances of galvanizing the 1.5 m votes in Western province, with both Jirongo and Kombo running for presidency?
As for the Luhya vote I would say what you
might see day after the ballot will be cast is what you will get.
Luhyas (and a political science professor once said this is a
loose amalgamation of thirteen distinct ethnic groups) are a
politically highly promiscuous ethnic formation. Examples are
there for all to see in Musikari (Bukusu plural for
“askari”) Kombo’s frivolous negotiations for
presidential appointments in exchange for Luhya loyalty; or in
Moi’s time, the parading of Luhya bureaucratic
“who-is-who” to demonstrate to the community that
they were a favored lot or yet again in Martin Shikuku’s
state house “ugali-kidogo” escapades that shot ethnic
“nuclear dirty bombs” into original FORD unity in
1992 throwing the opposition in disarray and scuttling the hopes
for “restoration of democracy”. A thirteen tribe
block vote for Raila from the Luhyas is not a guarantee. The same
is true for any other candidate. The ethnic group has no uniform
political resolve and exercises their stake in some very
unsettling ways; call it clumsy political bedroom
manners.
It behoves Raila’s campaign strategists
to be aware of the political metamorphosis in these ethnic
enclaves and to fight tooth and nail to debunk political and hate
mythology by crafting and articulating campaign messages that
rise above myopic ethnic thinking and engagement. Raila must
reach out individually and as a representation of the reviled Luo
persona and use the ethnic stereotypes and bashing as an
opportunity to demonstrate the potential for productive
partnerships with other communities. A time has come for Odinga
and the Luo to shed the cloak of ethnic haughtiness and embrace
pragmatically the politics of collaboration and the need for
humility in the resultant relationships. I would say, for
example, the intellectually towering presence of Prof
Nyong’o at the ODM-K secretariat scared some party members
and caused them to say, “You see, that’s the epitome
of Luo arrogance”. Some actions and moves might seem
innocent but turn out to be impolitic at the same time. For
example, it is impolitic for the prolific laudatory media
writings about Raila to be almost exclusively authored by Luos.
The presidential candidate must curve a national image by
conditioning written commentary about him to be ethnically
neutral. His written political history would gradually generate
objective national fervor and develop his image as a pillar of
hope equally lauded across ethnic, class, generational, and
social divides. Luhyas must appropriate their right to view and
write about Raila in their own way, their estimation of his worth
stemming from their own oral rhetoric. The same should apply to
the Miji Kenda, Rendille, Pokot, Kamba and Bajuni. He has to win
their hearts and then, their support and
votes.
- What tactics can ODM employ to yank the solid Bungoma vote from the wings of Kombo/FordK? I think Bungoma people are not entirely against ODM, but will need a lot of skillful persuasion.
The same that he should employ in securing the
vote in Luoland i.e. DO NOT TAKE ANYTHING FOR GRANTED!! Skilful
persuasion is needed for a presidential candidate who, thanks to
new political dispensation, is only slowly emerging from the
ashes of negative ethnicity and stereotypical demonization of his
own image and marginalization of his community. This need not
come from his Luo followers but must of necessity come from a
carefully choreographed campaign rhetoric trumpted by a
multi-ethnic outfit. Bukusus are of the persuasion that Raila
fought with and denied Wamalwa Kijana an effective competition
for the presidency by breaking away from FORD-K. Acknowledging
such persuasion as a negative blot in the history of ethnic
relations is a sure step to open good conversation with a people
whose pride was stung in the political fight and scratch
game.
- How important is Mutula Kilonzo’s frequent, but belated call for unity among the two ODMs? Is ODM stronger with Kalonzo running on his own, or with him back?
Mutula and one Prof Makau Mutua are in the same
mould except, where Mutula the lawyer appears suave and
ready to play “wolf-in-sheepskin”
compromise broker, Makau Mutua is a bare-knuckled
merchant-of-hate-for-hire who is ready to shed his intellectual
cloak and engage in naked ethnic fisticuffs. I digress here.
Mutula’s perennial overtures are intended to salvage a
marriage gone awry with pleas that aim at minimizing
Kalonzo’s loss of face. How far the Moi lawyer and hence
regime prop can go stands to be seen.
- What would be the impact of Kalonzo joining Kibaki?
The move would cast Kalonzo as an opportunist
and Kibaki as a survivalist incumbent president. There are few
ways for Kalonzo to repair his critically damaged credibility
without playing second fiddle, eating humble pie and saying
goodbye to his presidential ambitions. Kalonzo’s claim to a
solid Kamba vote is doubtful and was mostly predicated on his
winning the presidential ticket in a “ready-to-win”
ODM-K outfit, not without it. Joining Kibaki would not guarantee
Kalonzo the running-mate spot. There are other worthy claimants
to that turf. The question would be, “What exactly is
Kalonzo bringing to the table?”
- Why is Ngilu procrastinating about her political future?, could she be a likely victim of the maddening Kalonzo wave in Ukambani?
Ngilu is a characteristic procrastinator who
has gotten away with this trait even when logic dictated that
allies should part ways with her. She has political value,
however, which can be as detrimental as it can be useful. In her
bumbling ways she manages to engage national attention more than
many politicians can say for themselves. As an ethnic Kamba
politician, she has influent that would be a great plus for a
presidential candidate. Right now she holds two ace cards in her
hands: the Narc party “ownership” and the reserve
bench player for Kalonzo’s position in ODM. One other
important card is, she is a woman and personifies women’s
struggle for equal representation. She is an asset a candidate
should ogle avariciously.
Wilbur
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